PET Decision Tree Guide

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1. Introduction

According to the European Union Agency for Cyber Security, *Privacy-Enhancing Technologies (PETs)* is a term that covers the broader range of technologies that are designed for supporting privacy and data protection. These technologies incorporate the data protection principles by minimizing personal data use, maximizing data security and/or giving control to data subjects over their data. Examples of PETs include pseudonymization, multi-party-computation, differential privacy and homomorphic encryption. The development and emerging popularity of using PETs in data processing operations aligns with current discussions around the idea of shaping technology according to privacy principles, as new technologies may bring about unforeseen risks. At the same time, legislation is updated to catch up with these developments, such as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) being a main regulator of data privacy within the EU. GDPR obliges organizations i.a. to take (technical) measures to ensure privacy by design and default as data protection principles. The use of PETs helps organizations to comply with these principles.

The benefit of using PETs becomes evident when an organization wishes to tackle challenges in relation to data sharing with another party. Legal regulations like GDPR may render this exchange impossible with traditional data-exchange based approaches. Next to privacy, also (other) data confidentiality reasons can prevent data sharing, even when legislation does not explicitly prohibit this. For instance, due to other regulations or organizational interests, e.g. due to commercial interests or agreements with customers. We therefore do not limit the scope of PETs to only personal data. PETs enable a paradigm where organizations can *leverage the information* that is stored in sensitive data[1] *without revealing the sensitive data* itself.

[1] Note: multiple times we will refer in this guide as well as in the decision tree to ‘sensitive data’. This is meant in a broad setting: data which may be sensitive due to many reasons (privacy, commercial confidentiality, etc.).

So how does one transit from theory to practice? Acknowledging that PETs might help you to solve a business challenge is only the first step to applying a specified PET to that challenge. Among the many steps that need to be taken, certainly a crucial one is to understand the business challenge at hand and investigate which PET can facilitate a solution. Which data is processed? What is the intended result? Which regulations apply? What are the technical constraints? Which PETs could be applicable? How do we balance technical guarantees (PET characteristics) and legal guarantees (formal agreements)? Although PETs are technologies, this is not a discussion between technical people only – it is a conversation between various stakeholders with diverse expertise. Just like PETs enable privacy-enhanced solutions for single- and multi-organizational challenges, our work enables a multi-disciplinary discussion about PETs in the context of such business challenge.

The tool that we present is a Decision Tree that is designed to support the choice of a *PET in the context of inter-organizational data analysis* and can be useful when performing a Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA).

This document serves as a guide for an organization to use the Decision Tree efficiently and successfully. Its purpose is to facilitate a discussion that involves technical and legal aspects; however, note that it is not a legal document and you should always conduct your own legal assessment before using PETs. The tool itself is available on https://decisiontree.mpc.tno.nl/.

The Decision Tree and this document were created by the CBS, KNB, Rabobank, TNO and the University of Maastricht (who was involved in an earlier phase) in a use case of Brightlands Techruption[2]. Both technical as well as legal and compliance experts from the different organizations actively contributed. Brightlands Techruption helps corporate companies, governmental organizations and knowledge institutes partner up, so they can develop innovative solutions through the application of disruptive technologies like AI, MPC, SSI and blockchain.

Reading guide

The Decision Tree and this document are written for innovative departments with an interest in PETs to solve their business challenge. All readers were assumed to have a somewhat technical background in the initial stage, but since then we tried to broaden the scope and terminology to also include non-technical readers – particularly with background in law and regulations.

The intended use of the document, however, relates to complex, multidisciplinary challenges and likewise it is challenging to make the entire document easily readable to everyone. Instead, we think that the best results are obtained if all stakeholders scan this document, read those parts that relate to their expertise, and vocalize those parts in the joint discussion.

The document is structured as follows. Section 2 contains guidance on how the Decision Tree should be used. Section 3 describes the overall scope of the Decision Tree and this document. Section 4 contains several relevant legal considerations regarding PETs, primarily focusing on GDPR. Section 5 describes levels of data-sharing risk mitigations when using PETs. Section 6 contains disclaimers and explanations about the decision tree nodes when needed.

Appendix A gives a summary of the different PETs that are considered here. Appendix B describes different security scenarios when considering PETs. Appendix C describes a non-exhaustive list of

[2] https://www.brightlands.com/en/brightlands-smart-services-campus/brightlands-techruption

potential attack vectors when considering PETs. Appendix D gives a brief overview of the different lawful grounds.

2. Decision tree usage

We encourage the reader to visit our webpage, look around, get insights and start a discussion. Before doing so, however, it is important to understand a bit more about the usage of the tree; both conceptually and technically.

First and foremost, it is crucial to understand that the main objective of the tree is to facilitate the process of exploring the potential of several PETs as solution to your business problem. It achieves this objective by presenting the user with multidisciplinary questions and topics that need to be discussed already in an early stage of the process. At the same time, the user can explore the impact of the answers to these questions; for example, how the answers lead to a suggested PET solution. The discussions and explorations will often benefit by involving all stakeholders (business, risk officers, privacy officers, compliancy, data scientists, IT architects, end users). Although the decision tree always concludes by suggesting a PET suggestion, the real value is in the questions that lead you there.

Second, related to the final remark above, there may be many solutions to any problem. Rather than running through the tree once and expecting a definite outcome, it is more likely that multiple paths are feasible. For example, there may be a problem where one possible solution is to use a PET e.g. MPC, whereas another path might lead you to a different solution e.g. to outsource processing operations to a trusted third party. Both solutions have their advantages in terms of data protection compliance, data processing efforts, governance, flexibility and so on. From that perspective, the questions in the decision tree highlight some of the possibilities and potential requirements of a solution. These questions can thus facilitate the user in formulating, exploring, and discussing the requirements of the use case. Such discussions may in turn lead to adjusted use case requirements, which then lead to alternative paths in the decision tree. It is quite likely that several of these iterations are made in the development of a use case and exploring the possible solutions; in particular, you might walk through the tree many times while gradually improving your understanding of the problem and the applicable PET technologies. The tool checklist[3] also facilitates this process.

Third, it is important that all organizations that participate in a collaboration should traverse the tree from their own perspective (again, involving all stakeholders). Different organizations may have different roles in the solution, e.g. they may share different types of data (if any) and their role from a legal or compliancy perspective may yield other restrictions or responsibilities. Every organization should think about their role in various potential solutions and discuss the implications and preferences collaboratively to identify the solution that works best for the collaborators as a group. Additionally, this applies to single aspects in the tree as well. Every challenge can be viewed from a different perspective and which of these is most important differs per organization. The main perspectives for addressing a challenge in the tree are depicted in the following figure.

[3] https://decisiontree.mpc.tno.nl/documentation/Checklist.pdf



From a technical perspective, it is important to know both the fit and limitations in terms of end goal, IT setup or data science. Legal and compliance should be consulted to prevent potential legislative and privacy restrictions in a later stage. Lastly, there might be specific policy or supervisory guidelines within an organization that may limit the possibilities to use a specific implementation, for instance a restriction on setting up any third parties for the solution.

Fourth, it should be recognized that many challenges are composed of multiple smaller challenges. One should traverse the tree as many times as applications you wish to develop. For example, in the context of Machine Learning, you may run through once for model training and once for model evaluation.

Finally, we repeat and emphasize that the tool is no (legal) advise. It is extremely challenging to capture the complexity and context-dependency of generic real-world challenges and the subtleties in the variety of PET solutions in a tool. Instead, aiming at a first step in applying PET solutions, the purpose of the tool is to facilitate both the internal and external interdisciplinary discussion for organizations that are interested in using PETs for the challenges they face.

2.1. Choosing a view

When accessing the tool, you immediately see that the tree is available in two different formats: an interactive tree graph and a questionnaire. Both views contain the same information/decision paths. Which view is more useful depends on the user's preference. Our rough suggestion on how to profit from both is:

1. First, use the interactive tree. Explore different paths to get a feeling of the tool's utility and the reasoning of the line of questions and answers.
2. Then, use the questionnaire view to get a suggestion from the tool and export said suggestion along with the choices that led you there (by clicking the Save as PDF button).

We now elaborate further on both views.

2.2. Interactive tree

The interactive tree is a graph where the user is asked to answer questions regarding the challenge they seek to tackle and its characteristics by clicking on the equivalent visual elements. The interactive tree view allows the user to explore different paths rapidly and visualizes the many possibilities. Exploring the tree in this view can assist the user with understanding how certain (early) choices give direction to the proposed solution for various scenarios.

More specifically, the elements in the tree are:

- **Rectangular:** A question and nodes that link it to the possible answers. The text contains a question mark element that when hovered over pops up a window where the question in hand is explained.
- **Rhombus:** A possible answer. This element is clickable and the user can hence select an answer. Some of the answers can also be hovered over to produce pop-up explanations. When an answer is selected, the next question in the path is revealed.
- **Rectangular with rounded edges:** A decision on the PET technology based on the traversed path. The text contains a question mark element that when hovered over pops up a window where the decision is explained.

The other buttons seen on screen are:

- *Toggle style:* Choice to change colors.
- *Toggle contrast:* Choice to shift to black and white view.
- *Expand tree:* Choice to see the entire tree with all possible paths.
- *Collapse tree:* Choice to collapse the tree, i.e. reset the path.
- *Auto collapse alternative routes:* When selected, alternative routes automatically collapse when a different route is selected.

2.3. Questionnaire

The questionnaire is a linear list that contains the same questions and answers as the interactive tree. It consists of a rectangular element that contains the question and the possible answers. When an answer is chosen, the next question appears and the previous non-chosen answers disappear. Like the interactive tool, the text of the questions (and sometimes the answers) also contains a question mark that pops up an explanation when hovered over. The final element that appears will be the PET technology suggested based on the previous answers to the questions. The utility of the buttons on screen is:

- **Back**: The last answer is unchosen and hence the previous question appears again.
- **Reset**: The path resets, hence all the previous answers are unchosen and the initial question appears.
- **Save as PDF**: A document is saved in the user's device that includes all the choices made and the suggested PET.

The questionnaire view is simpler than the interactive tree.

2.4. Type of problem

The first question being reached in both the decision tree as well as the questionnaire is: what is the type of problem being considered? In this section we will give a brief explanation on the types of problems that are included:

- **Machine learning:** For the Machine Learning type of problem, we consider problems where an actual machine learning or AI model is involved. This can be via different ways: either the parties aim to *train* a new machine learning model on data, or the parties aim to *evaluate* or apply an existing (already trained) machine learning model on data. Machine learning is a broad concept, containing a broad range of classification or regression models, intended to make a prediction based on a number of features. We do not consider other forms of statistical analysis as they are separately examined in the Statistical Analysis type of

problem. It may be that the specific problem you consider fits both machine learning and statistical analysis – in that case, it may be good to traverse both paths in the tree.

- **Set intersection:** In this type, we consider problems where two (or more) parties have a list of items (e.g. persons like patients or customers), and wish to determine the overlap between these two lists (the intersection). Set Intersection can be either a subproblem of any of the other problems, or a problem by itself. An example of the second scenario is when organizations wish to match their datasets without planning to perform a specific analysis per se. In this case, only the Set Intersection route shall be traversed. On the contrary, when additional analysis is intended, the tree shall be traversed twice: once for Set Intersection and once for said analysis (Machine Learning, Statistical Analysis or Synthetic Data Generation).
- **Statistical analysis:** By statistical analysis, we refer to cases where one or more parties wish to compute a set of statistical metrics (e.g. counts, averages, standard deviations, quantiles, histograms, frequency plots, etc.) on their data and receive the results. Also other simple computations on the data, even if not strictly statistical in nature, may be considered when traversing this path.
- **Synthetic data generation:** Synthetic data generation refers to cases where one wishes to generate new (fake) data based on existing data's distribution and characteristics. For instance, to validate and test models, or to train machine learning models. Here we assume that the original data used to generate the synthetic data is sensitive. If the original data is not, it is very straightforward to synthesize data without having to employ some privacy preserving technology to protect the original data from potential reconstruction by using the synthetic data.

3. Scoping

In this guide, as well as in the accompanying decision tree, the focus is on application of PETs in the context of inter-organizational data analysis – i.e., multiple organizations (which could also be part of one larger organization) aim to perform joint analyses on their data sets. For this purpose, we focus on a relevant subset of PETs in our decision tree, see Appendix A for more details. These PETs are:

- Federated Learning
- Secure Multi-Party Computation (divided into homomorphic encryption and secret sharing)
- Trusted Secure Environments (or Trusted Execution Environments)
- Differential Privacy

This does not mean that other PETs are not relevant, but we feel these are several of the more important categories when considering the purpose of inter-organizational data analysis. Furthermore, next to privacy of individuals there can be other reasons to apply these PETs, e.g., when dealing with commercially confidential data – these other possible applications are also in scope.

When considering protection of information in data analysis, there are two views of privacy, namely:

1. Input Privacy
2. Output Privacy

Input Privacy refers to the process of keeping the input data to a computation private. The necessity of input privacy is self-evident in the context of sharing sensitive data, as lack thereof is equivalent to

sharing raw data among parties, which defeats the purpose. On the other hand, *Output Privacy* refers to techniques used to ensure that the output of a computation does not reveal information about the input data. Preserving output privacy is not always trivial. In a recent case, the US Census Bureau showcased that they were able to use their own publicly released statistics to reconstruct the raw data of the individuals described by these statistics[4]. This result motivated the Bureau to incorporate Differential Privacy in their computations to achieve output security.

In this document, we focus primarily on input privacy. We do include one state-of-the-art output security technique in our list of PETs, namely Differential Privacy. However, we should stress that there are other disclosure avoidance techniques that detect whether the output of an analysis leaks information about the input data. These other output privacy techniques are out of scope.

Several times we refer to 'sensitive data' in both this document as well as the decision tree. This is meant in a broad setting: data which may be sensitive due to many reasons (privacy, commercial confidentiality, etc.). This is a broader definition than the term 'sensitive personal data' used in the GDPR, where it refers to specific categories of personal data (medical, ethnic background, etc.).

4. Legal considerations

4.1 Legal framework

PETs can be used for collaborative analysis of data while guaranteeing data confidentiality. PETs can be applied to both enhance the protection of data privacy and increase confidentiality of trade secrets or any other type of confidentiality that needs to be upheld. The identification of the type of data you want to apply the PET technologies to is crucial for the determination of the legal framework the PET technology has to operate in. When using personal data this legal framework would be the applicable data protection law, such as the GDPR and national privacy laws. When using business confidential information this may be a different framework, such as competition law or (internal) rules and regulations with regard to trade secrets or intellectual property. Also, there may be other (upcoming) legislation that may apply, e.g., with regards to Machine Learning the (proposed) Artificial Intelligence Resolution from the European Commission. In the following paragraphs we dive into the legal framework of the GDPR.

The Decision Tree only includes legal considerations at certain specific decision markers. Neither the tree itself nor the current document should be taken as legal advice. Therefore, it is strongly advised to consult your legal department at an early stage when considering the use of PETs. Even more, it is highly recommended to discuss the different outcomes of the Decision Tree with your legal department.

4.1.1 Personal data

The processing[5] of personal data within the EU and EEA requires compliance with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and national legislation of EU member states. GDPR defines personal data as any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person. Information about an identified natural person means information about someone who's identity is already known.

[4] https://www2.census.gov/about/policies/2020-03-05-differential-privacy.pdf

[5] The term 'processing' is an umbrella term used in the GDPR and means any operation or set of operations which is performed on personal data or on sets of personal data, whether or not by automated means, such as collection, recording, organisation, structuring, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, restriction, erasure or destruction

Information about an identifiable natural person means information about someone who's identity can be derived directly or indirectly by that information in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person.

Within personal data there is the distinction between regular personal data and special categories of personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade union membership, and the processing of genetic data, biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person, data concerning health or data concerning a natural person's sex life or sexual orientation and personal data relating to criminal convictions and offences. GDPR restricts the processing of special categories of personal data and requires additional safeguards when processing such data or even prohibits such processing. The use of PETs in the processing operations of such data can be extra helpful when trying to tackle compliance issues while processing this kind of data.

4.1.2 Principles and legal grounds

The application of PETs are meant to enhance the privacy of lawfully processed data. Hence, every processing must have a lawful basis regardless the use of a PET. The GDPR states that there are six lawful bases that can be used to justify the processing.

1. Consent. The consent of a data subject to the processing of his/her personal data
2. Legitimate interests: There is a weighed and balanced legitimate interest where processing is needed and the interest is not overridden by others
3. Public interest: public authorities and organizations in the scope of public duties and interest
4. Contractual necessity: Processing is needed in order to enter into or perform a contract.
5. Legal obligations: the controller is obliged to process personal data for a legal obligation.
6. Vital interests: it is vital that specific data are processed for matters of life and death.

For more detailed information please check Appendix D. Once the question regarding legal basis is answered, be sure to also answer the question whether the processing relates to specific national data protection legislation that goes beyond the GDPR. For example, is it legally allowed for the data to be shared or even leave the premises when it concerns medical data (medical confidentiality)?

Next, GDPR requires that the processing of personal data must be in accordance with the basic data protection principles. These principles include: transparency, lawfulness, fairness, purpose limitation, data minimisation, accuracy, storage limitation, integrity and confidentiality, accountability and the principle of Data Protection by Design and Default (DPbDD). These principles are governed by the overarching notion of proportionality. This means that the processing is proportionate to the purposes of the intended and that these purposes are obtained in the least intrusive way or most privacy-friendly manner. The use of PETs can help make the processing more proportionate. Example: the processing of personal data by a municipality is needed to make a policy to help multi-problematic households (criminality, poverty, debt, low income, etc.). Data from different databases is needed to know how big this problem actually is. Sharing of the data is difficult, risky and would entail a disproportionate infringement of fundamental rights and freedoms of all citizens of a particular municipality. The use of PETs can help reduce the infringement of individual privacy rights

DPbDD is the obligation to organisations to implement appropriate technical and organisational measures which are designed to implement the before mentioned data protection principles and to integrate the necessary safeguards into the processing in order to meet the requirements of the GDPR and protect the rights and freedoms of people. A technical or organisational measure and safeguard can be anything from the use of advanced technical solutions, such as PETs to the basic training of personnel. Making use of PETs is therefore a way to implement such technical measures in your processing operations and can thus be helpful to realise compliance with these principles, specifically the DPbDD principle. However, once you have decided to make use of a PET this does not automatically guarantee complete compliance with the DPbDD principle, let alone GDPR compliance as a whole. Be aware that use of PETs may entail risks of using too much data to maximise the (learning) process which can impede the abovementioned principles such as purpose limitation. These and other risks need to be categorised and addressed from a technical and a legal perspective in a data governance document (for example a joint controller agreement) along with a Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA), see Sections 4.1.3 and 4.1.4. In the table in Section 4.2 an overview is given of the data protection principles in relation to the possibility of PETs as useful measures to meet compliance with abovementioned GDPR principles.

Only in case no personal data is processed – for example if it should concern data of legal persons, or data can be anonymized before processing, the GDPR does not apply.

4.1.3 Controller and processor

Processing personal data can entail risks for people. These risks may result in infringements with their fundamental rights and freedoms, such as discrimination, exclusion, stigmatization and loss of control over owns data. Compliance with the before mentioned data protection principles are meant to mitigate these risks. Besides, organizations which process personal data not in accordance with applicable legislation may get hefty fines and experience reputation loss. GDPR identifies multiple actors that have compliance responsibilities and obligations. Two of the most important actors are the ‘controller’ and the ‘processor’. If you determine the purposes (which data is processed to what end and on what grounds) and the means (how the processing will take place) of the processing operation in a decisive way, you are a controller. In a situation where multiple parties determine together purposes and means, these parties are joint controller under the GPDR. If your involvement in the processing operations is limited to technical service and technical support on behalf of the controller and you don't determine yourself the purposes and the means of the processing, you are a processor under the GDPR.

4.1.4 Data Protection Impact Assessment

One of the obligations of the controllers is to assess the risks that may rise when personal data is processed. Commonly this is done by performance of data inventory. Sometimes a Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) has to be performed (article 35 GDPR). Part of the DPIA is to conclude the technical and organisational measures that need to be taken to mitigate the identified risks in the assessment. In this part of the DPIA process PETs may be the solution to some of the identified risks. The controller or joint controllers would be the organisation(s) that choose the PET that is going to be used rather than a processor. PETs can therefore be a valuable asset when mitigating risks and fulfil its obligations. The decision tree tool can therefore be useful when performing a DPIA.

4.2 GDPR principles in relation to PETs

In the schedule below we provide insight how the PETs that are suggested in the decision tree can help to contribute to fulfilling a data protection principle set out in the GPDR. We also give insight

how this relate to the use of the Decision Tree and what expertise you might need to consult in your organisation if you wish to proceed in applying a PET.

Principle/ obligation	What is it?	Can a PET[6] help? Yes/No/Partially	Expertise
Proportionality	The processing is proportionate in relation to the intended goals and is done in the least privacy intrusive way.	Yes, classic processing operations that are needed to achieve legitimate goals may seem disproportionate. PETs in general can help solve these problems.	Technical + legal
Lawfulness	One of the main principles of the GDPR is that the processing is lawful (article 5 GDPR). In order to assess if the processing is lawful, one of the legal ground for processing personal data (article 6 GDPR) should apply	No, neither suggested PET will create a legal ground such as consent, legal obligation or the performance of a task of public interest.	Legal
Fairness	One of the main principles of the GDPR is that the processing is fair (article 5(1)(a) GDPR)	Partially, MPC and Federated Learning can be used to restrict use and technically prevent data is used unintentionally for purposes that negatively impact an individual, which is an important part of fair processing.	Technical + legal + security
Transparency	Inform people how personal data is collected, used, consulted or otherwise processed and to what extent the personal data are or will be processed. (article 5(1)(a) GDPR, but also 12-14 GDPR).	No, the suggested PETs do not in itself enhance compliance with GDPR or give people control over the data.	Technical + legal + security
Purpose limitation	Personal data collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a manner that is incompatible with those purposes	Partially/Yes, MPC and Federated Learning can be used to restrict use and prevent data is used unintentionally for purposes out of scope i.e. business rules of the MPC.	Technical + legal + security

[6] PET has the meaning of the PETs used in the decision tree: MPC (secret sharing and homomorphic encryption), federated learning, trusted secure environment, differential privacy.

		Trusted secure environment can help to limit the amount of data to be processed specifically for the intended purposes. Note that results from a PET analysis are not controlled by PETs (anymore) and can in principle be used for other (unintended) purposes. For each newly considered purpose, a new legal assessment needs to be done.	
Data minimisation	Processing personal data is adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary in relation to the purposes for which they are processed.	Yes, MPC, Federated Learning and trusted secure environment can allow you to precisely identify the data to be used for the intended outcome.	Technical + legal + security
Accuracy	Personal data is processed accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date; every reasonable step must be taken to ensure that personal data that are inaccurate, having regard to the purposes for which they are processed, are erased or rectified without delay.	Yes, MPC allows you to develop specific business rules to double check the algorithmic calculations. No, DP in general will (intentionally) result in less accurate outcomes when processing personal data in order to safeguard output privacy.	Technical + legal + security
Storage limitation	Personal data is kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects for no longer than is necessary for the purposes for which the personal data are processed; personal data may be stored for longer periods insofar as the personal data will be processed solely for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes.	Partially. PETs do not directly contribute to storage limitation, however, often PETs offer the opportunity to not copy personal data but to process the data in memory. This results in no or very short storage periods, other than archiving purposes. Features such as automated deletion are not result of using PETs and can also be implemented with non-PET AI or other algorithms.	Technical + legal + security

Integrity and Confidentiality	Personal data processed in a manner that ensures appropriate security of the personal data, including protection against unauthorised or unlawful processing and against accidental loss, destruction or damage, using appropriate technical or organisational measures.	Partially, all PETs contribute very strongly to confidentiality. FL and MPC keeps data confidential without leaving the premises. Trusted secure environment keeps data confidential and integer while leaving the premises. Differential privacy makes it possible to make analysis on data sets while withholding information about the individuals in the dataset. Integrity is only slightly improved with MPC and FL, since no data needs to be copied to another trusted third party, which results in new integrity risks.	Technical + legal + security
Accountability	The controller shall be responsible for, and be able to demonstrate compliance with, the data protection principles.	Yes, using PETs will make it possible to proof compliance with the GDPR data protection principles, most importantly confidentiality. Often when using PETs, there are joint controllers with different responsibilities, instead of one controller with all responsibilities.	Technical + legal + security
Data Protection by Design and Default (DPbDD)	Taking into account the state of the art, the cost of implementation and the nature, scope, context and purposes of processing as well as the risks of varying likelihood and severity for rights and freedoms of natural persons posed by the processing, the controller shall, both at the time of the determination of the means for processing and at the time of the processing itself, implement appropriate technical and organisational measures, such as pseudonymisation,	Partially, PETs can be employed as a measure in accordance with the DPbDD requirements if appropriate in a risk based approach. PETs in themselves do not necessarily cover the GDPR compliance as a whole or DPbDD entirely.	Technical + legal + security

	which are designed to implement data-protection principles, such as data minimisation, in an effective manner and to integrate the necessary safeguards into the processing in order to meet the requirements of this Regulation and protect the rights of data subjects.		
International transfer (outside EEA)	Transfer of (meta) data from one country to another for research purposes.	Partially. MPC, HE and FL keep data confidential, but the encrypted or aggregated data being shared in these PETs can still be considered personal data in some cases. In case of an international transfer to a country outside the EEA faces challenges regarding the continuity of the same level of data protection, the PETS might help as supplementary measures to overcome these challenges.	Legal + Security

4.3 Ethics

Not unlike other technologies the use of PETs raises ethical questions besides legal questions. An example of ethical issues is the foreseen use of the outcome of the computation. Improper use of the outcome must be prevented at any moment, such as improper product and service development or improper marketing towards clients or data subjects, personal gain or negative profiling and the development of questionable AI technologies. The used PETs could limit the risks to a certain level but cannot mitigate fundamental ethical objections.

Also, the PET itself could be open for debate. Therefore, security measures need to be taken into consideration as well. Insufficient consideration of security risks could lead to exposure of personal data. See Appendix B and C. In this line of thought it would be well to formalise the data governance by closing an agreement between all parties concerning integrity of the input data to the computation. When the processing of data might be a high risk in general a data privacy impact assessment would be the least of measures to take.

5. Levels of data-sharing risk mitigation

If personal data is involved in a collaborative solution, then usually (processed) personal data will also need to leave the premises in some form. PETs generally handle this data in some encrypted or aggregated form that greatly reduces the risk of data subject identification and data breaches. They are therefore also a measure adding to the obligation for taking sufficient technical measures preventing personal data security breaches.

PETs ensure varying levels of risk mitigation. Some technologies provide mathematical guarantees of the security that they provide and the types of attacks that they protect against. Some PETs provide protection in many scenarios, some against few. Often, however, it is hard to provide formal, generic guarantees and an assessment should be conducted for the specific challenge at hand. *It is important to be aware of these differences both from a technical and from a legal perspective; if one PET does not adhere to your constraints, there might be another one that does. Also, in the legal assessment, it is important to be aware of the security scenarios and the fact that PETs provide different levels of protection.*

To get a better feel of security scenarios, please refer to Appendix B and Appendix C.

Unfortunately, as the security requirements grow the pool of feasible technologies shrinks. If your solution requires data sharing in e.g., an aggressive, competitive environment, it might be that only few PETs satisfy your criteria. In that case it may help to explore various routes: stronger PETs, in combination with organisational measures or legal agreements that mitigate part of the risks. Perhaps a slight alteration to your proposed solution results in the exchange of less sensitive information (e.g., computations performed by another party). In the end, risks can be mitigated in various ways and keeping a wider view of the possibilities helps finding the best solution to your challenge.

6. Decision tree guide

In this section we will include disclaimers and explanations about the decision tree nodes when needed.

6.1. Data sources independence

In a node we ask whether the data sources are independent of each other. Independent in this context means that the analysis can technically be performed on the data set of any of the data sources without including samples from another.

6.2. Federated Analytics/Learning

In the tree, we use the term Federated Analytics to describe statistical analysis (e.g., aggregation) that is performed in some federated manner. We use Federated Learning to signify specifically that the process of *model training* occurs in a federated manner.

6.3. Data vs Model and Output sensitivity

A dataset can be sensitive, but also a trained model can be sensitive. When it comes to a dataset, it corresponds to the data itself being under protection. This can be due to different reasons, including privacy, commercial reasons or simply due to other policies of the organization owning the data. See also Section 4.

By model sensitivity, we mean that the trained model itself is to be protected. This can occur either if there are serious concerns that the model can leak information about the data on which it was trained or if the model owner wishes to keep the model private for organizational reasons, such as commercial confidentiality.

Model sensitivity is a specific but important example of the broader concept of output sensitivity or output privacy. Often the focus of PETs is on keeping the input data, as well as the computation, hidden. But also, the output of a computation may be sensitive, specifically if it can lead back to the

sensitive input data. For example, knowing the average annual salary of your department in 2018 and in 2019, combined with the fact that there was only one change in the department members, allows you to deduce the salary of the newest colleague. This closely links to the concept of output privacy, see Section 3. *Output Privacy* refers to techniques used to ensure that the output of a computation does not reveal information about the input data.

6.4. Set Intersection

The type of problem Set Intersection can be either a subproblem of any of the other problems, or a problem by itself. An example of the second scenario is when organizations wish to match their datasets without planning to perform a specific analysis per se. In this case, only the Set Intersection route shall be traversed. On the contrary, when additional analysis is intended, the tree shall be traversed twice: once for Set Intersection and once for said analysis (Machine Learning, Statistical Analysis or Synthetic Data Generation).

6.5. Sensitivity of locally computed values

If you traverse the tree for the case of Machine Learning or Statistical Analysis, it might be that you come across the question: “Are the locally computed values to be exchanged sensitive?”. This question might seem vague and/or unclear. Let us consider an extreme example of local sensitivity to outline the reasoning of this question.

Let us assume that two parties wish to calculate collaborative statistics on their data. Let us also assume that each party is aware of the number of samples the other party owns. Let us finally assume that party A only owns 2 samples. Then, we can immediately realize that if party A shares with party B the local mean and variance of a feature they own, then party B will be able to fully reconstruct that feature for both samples owned by party A.

As mentioned, this is an extreme example and in practice the risk of freely exchanging locally computed values is nuanced and often hard to quantify. That being said, various recent research papers [references] have focused on reconstructing data from local model updates, even in far less extreme examples of local sensitivity. As a result, any party participating in data sharing need to consider such dangers and carefully plan the protocol of sharing intermediate values that may leak much more information than immediately obvious.

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Appendix A. Brief introduction per PET

For traditional analysis, we assume that all data is locally available (centralized data), thus allowing us to focus on the system efficiency, model performance, and applicability of some analysis of interest. Additionally, we like to assume that the end user of the output has no evil intentions of any kind; for example, we like to assume that the end user has no incentive to reverse-engineer the training data in the context of machine learning. Although this setting suffices in many cases, it also poses severe limitations to collaboration with sensitive data. PETs enable such collaborations.

First consider the assumption of centralized data and instead assume that data is distributed over different organizations or even different devices (smartphones). In this case, it may be time-consuming or even infeasible to send all the distributed data to a central location due to constrained resources, such as high latency or small bandwidth. These constraints motivate the development of techniques that allow for analysis on distributed data. We will shortly describe federated learning, which is a type of learning from distributed data with lower latency, less power consumption, and enhanced end users' privacy.

Another reason why not all data might be available in a central place is a reserve of sharing data, presumably motivated by the private or confidential nature of the data. This is easily perceived as a reason to not collaborate; however, in many machine learning scenarios only the raw data is sensitive and not the trained model. Several techniques therefore aim to compute (an approximation of) the trained model that respects the privacy of the underlying data. Differential privacy and secure multi-party computation are designed for this purpose and provide mathematical guarantees of the type of privacy that they provide. Federated learning was originally introduced to address issues that arise in the context of distributed analysis involving many devices. One of the improvements over centralized analyses is improved privacy since the data of any device is no longer shared in raw form. However, unlike the mathematically guaranteed privacy in secure multi-party computation protocols, the privacy benefits of federated learning are often hard to quantify. Federated learning is therefore regularly combined with secure multi-party combination or differential privacy or both to boost privacy.

We now describe the techniques in a bit more detail. Note that all techniques are relatively novel and are rapidly improved upon. The attacks that we refer to are described in more detail in Appendix C. Organizations and individuals that act independently of each other are all referred to as *parties*.

Federated Learning

Federated learning specifically targets the issue of learning on distributed data. The core concept is, for every party, to obtain a partial model by training on the data that is locally available. Then, the partial models are aggregated (by a dedicated aggregator party or in a peer-to-peer architecture) into a global model that captures the information of all data. In doing so, instead of sharing all raw data, only the local models are shared (Konečný et al. 2016; McMahan et al. 2017).

Communication of these local models is not quite as demanding as communication of the raw data, which was one of the main objectives. Complementary to (1) limited communicational resources, federated learning problems are characterized by (2) systems heterogeneity, (3) statistical heterogeneity, and (4) privacy concerns (T. Li et al. 2019). Note that these characteristics also set Federated Learning apart from distributed learning on multiple servers in a data farm.

For the privacy concerns, we note that federated learning achieves some level of privacy because the local models only represent aggregated information of the raw data. In practise, however, Federated Learning is known to be susceptible to several type of attacks including backdooring (Bagdasaryan et al. 2019) and reconstruction attacks (Z. Li et al. 2020; Zhu, Liu, and Han 2019) and it is generally complex to quantify the privacy that is obtained.

While the field of federated learning is evolving, the scope itself is becoming broader. In the past years, the term federated learning has often been used to describe any type of learning where the data is partitioned among parties. In this document and designed Decision Tree, we mainly consider the original federated architecture proposed by Google, and hence our claims and paths chosen in the tree are based on that. A next step of our work should be to broaden the scope and account for different federated solutions that have been proposed and may be of interest when considering the choice of a PET.

Secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC)

MPC also considers multiple parties that collaboratively wish to evaluate a function, exemplarily to train a machine learning model or the intersection of records in two databases. The promise of MPC is that, from a functional perspective, it is indistinguishable from an ideal trusted third party who receives the data from all parties, performs the computation and returns the result (Lindell 2020; Yao 1982). A direct consequence of this functionality is that a party's data is in no form revealed to any other party apart from what can be deduced from deliberately shared information (e.g. result of the computation).

MPC has been investigated in the academic world for several decades. In contrast to federated learning, MPC is a set of cryptographic techniques that focus on mathematically verifiable security guarantees and usually achieves that at the cost of (considerably) higher system requirements. The first MPC solutions were too involved to be applied to real-world challenges, but advancements in cryptography and computing and networking capabilities have reached a point where the several MPC solutions have been applied successfully. Currently, MPC solutions are tailored to a specific problem. This indicates that it is relatively time consuming to implement MPC solutions, but also implies that MPC solutions can be used only for the purpose that they were designed for. From a legal or compliancy perspective, this can be quite advantageous.

There are MPC protocols for various security models. Some of them only prevent honest parties to deduce information that they should not obtain; others additionally provide security against colluding (or hacked) parties and even parties that maliciously deviate from the protocol. The different security models are briefly described in Appendix B. Do note that the guarantees given by an MPC protocol, e.g. no data is revealed to any other party even if he acts malicious, always relate to the computation phase and not the result. So any information that can be gained from the output result is no longer secure. For example, if the intersection of two databases is securely computed and the result is revealed, then surely the result reveals membership of all records in the intersection. However, in an MPC protocol different choices can be made regarding what happens with the output result – for instance, it may be that only one party is allowed to see the output, or that the output is only revealed if it satisfies certain criteria.

There exist different types of MPC protocols. Two important categories are Homomorphic Encryption and Secret Sharing. Within these protocols there are different roles which each party will play. These can be best described as:

- *Input party*
  A party that inputs data in the computation (encrypted, or not)
- *Compute party*
  A party that does the computation (In an encrypted domain, or not)
- *Output party*
  A party that receives the results from the joint computation

Each role (or combination of roles) needs to be separately considered when researching the best solution and its complications.

Homomorphic Encryption

A homomorphic encryption protocol uses a public and a private key. The public key is known to everyone and can be used by the parties to encrypt data. The encryption protects the underlying data and can only be lifted using the private key. All parties can therefore encrypt their own data and share the encrypted data with one another. The homomorphic property ensures that analyses can also be performed on the encrypted data. Only when the analyses have been performed is encryption lifted using the private key. During all of the intermediate steps, the data remains encrypted and no secrets are revealed. Please note that the party which holds the private key can decrypt all of the encrypted data. This key is therefore very powerful and a potential privacy risk. It is crucial that this key be handled correctly. A common approach is to divide the private key into pieces so that no single party has access to the entire key.

Secret Sharing

Secret-sharing involves dividing secret data into pieces (shares) in such a way that a single share does not contain any information on the secret data. The shares can therefore be spread among the participating parties without revealing the secret data. Ironically, secret-sharing does not mean that a secret is shared with other parties. All parties distribute the shares of their own input data in this way. The second step is to carry out the analysis. Instead of one party performing the analysis of all data, all parties perform the same analysis of the shares they received from the other parties. All parties receive a different outcome from which nothing meaningful can be derived. Only when the parties combine these local, intermediate results can the analysis result be revealed. This is the third and final step of the MPC approach. This three-step approach is also called the share-compute-reveal approach.

Differential Privacy

Differential privacy is a mathematical framework that limits the amount of information about the input data that can be deduced from the result of a computation. The protection that it provides thus focusses on the output of a computation rather than the computation itself, which sets it apart from federated learning or MPC.

As discussed, neither federated learning nor MPC prevents parties from learning something that can be deduced from the result of the computation. For example, knowing the average annual salary of your department in 2018 and in 2019, combined with the fact that there was only one change in the department members, allows you to deduce the salary of the newest colleague. Differential Privacy strategically introduces specific mathematical uncertainty (noise) somewhere in a computation such that, given the (perturbed) result, it is impossible to make high-confidence deductions about the data of an individual (Dwork 2008). That is, if the average annual salary is computed with a differentially private mechanism, we will only be able to deduce a range of salaries that *probably*

includes the actual salary of our newest colleague. However, the addition of noise to the computation (to improve privacy) often reduces the usefulness of the outcome (e.g., reduced accuracy). A tuning parameter allows the user to trade-off privacy and quality of the model.

The above example only exhibits part of the power of differential privacy. When a differentially private mechanism is used to publish several statistics about the department then it is impossible for someone outside the department to deduce with certainty whether some individual works in the department. That is, differential privacy protects against membership inference. What makes differential privacy stand out is that this protection is independent of any background knowledge available to the attacker. Many other anonymization and pseudonymization techniques fail if the attacker has access to other (public) databases whose information can be used to infer details from the published data that were supposed to be protected.

To summarize, differential privacy limits the information about input data that can be extracted form a computation output. An attractive property of differential privacy is no amount of post-processing or background knowledge can reduce the privacy that is achieved by a differential privacy mechanism. Although it may be hard to show that a protocol is differentially private, the reward of doing so is that the protocol provides a strong protection against reconstruction, membership inference and background knowledge attacks - ideally without jeopardizing the model accuracy.

Trusted Secure Environment (TSE)

A trusted secure environment (TSE) is also known as a trusted execution environment (TEE) or a secure enclave. A TSE is a set of software and hardware features that provide an isolated execution environment to enable strong security guarantees for applications running in the TSE (Rashid 2020). Specifically, TSEs can provide confidentiality, integrity, and attestation. They enable a program to run secure computations over confidential data while providing strong isolation from other applications, the operating system, and the host (Brandão, Resende, and Martins 2021). TSEs establish an isolated execution environment that runs in parallel with a standard operating system, its aim is to defend sensitive code and data against privileged software attacks from a potentially compromised operation systems. Data is stored in the TSE, where it is impossible to view the data or operations performed on it from outside, even with a debugger. The TSE ensures only authorized code can access and compute on the data. The TSE can for example be used to protect the data once it is on the device: while the data is protected during transmission by using encryption, the TSE protects the data once it has been decrypted on the device.

Trusted Third Party (TTP)

The traditional means of performing analyses on sensitive data from multiple stakeholders concerns the involvement of a trusted third party (TTP). Such a TTP collects all input data necessary for the analyses, and provides output back to the involved parties. In this case, the party is aware of all of the assets and is responsible for privacy and confidentiality of the data – data processing agreements should be made between the data input parties and the TTP. Note: TTP is not a PET, but does appear in the decision tree as one of the options. In certain situations, a TTP may still be the most feasible solution. Also hybrid situations are possible, in which a TTP no longer has access to the data itself, but still can play a role in performing the computation done via PETs.

Appendix B. Security scenarios

We will describe several characteristics for security models to illustrate the variety of scenarios that one can encounter.

Security models

An exhaustive list of security models would be quite long and technical, so we only list a couple of characteristics that are part of a security model. The more adversarial scenarios will often not be very likely, but they help in getting a feel of the possibilities. Be aware that organizations do not always behave malicious on their own accord – they also expose that behaviour when an attacker infiltrated (e.g. hacked) some of them and act on their behalf.

- *Security type.* The security of the PET can depend on the computing capabilities of an attacker. Some PETs are resistant against classical computers only, some against both classical and quantum computers, and some provide security against any (future) computer with unlimited computing power (information-theoretic security).
- *Conspiring organizations.* A group of organizations in a PET solution may together try to break security and infer information of another organization.
- *Untrustworthy organizations.* Often it is assumed that all organizations in a PET solution adhere to the agreements made and implement and execute the solution as agreed upon. Additional measures must be considered if this assumption cannot be made.

Appendix C. Attack vectors

PET solutions do not guarantee protection from all potential attacks at any point in the process. But what would such an attack entail? Specific types of attacks may be more serious than other types of attacks and not all of them may be equally likely to happen.

To facilitate this discussion, we include a non-exhaustive list of potential attack vectors:

- *Reconstruction attack.* Reconstruct input data from the output data.
- *Membership inference.* Find out whether a certain record (person) is present in the input or output data set.
- *Property inference*. Retrieve the value of a certain attribute of a record (person) in the input or output dataset.
- *Model poisoning or backdooring (in Machine Learning)*: temper with the training phase of the machine learning to poison the model. The poisoned model may infer detailed information of some training data or provide forced (malicious) outputs for certain inputs.
- *Infrastructure attack*: an attack that aims to weaken the infrastructure software to insert a malicious algorithm, or to weaken security checks for repetitions (e.g. to avoid reconstruction attacks) or authentication/authorization to the infrastructure.

Appendix D. Lawful grounds

The processing of personal data must be based on at least one of the following six lawful grounds (article 6 (1) GDPR)

a) Consent	The data subject has given consent to the processing of his or her personal data for one or more specific purposes;
(b) Contractual obligation	Processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract;
(c) Legal obligation	Processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject;
(d) Vital interests	Processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject or of another natural person;
(e) Public interest	Processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller;
(f) Legitimate interests	Processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller of by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. [7]

[7] Regulation (EU) 2016/679 General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), European Parliament and the Council (27 April 2016) art. 6